Rationalism vs. Fideism in the Debate between Theists and Atheists

I wish the people at Books & Culture would get in the habit of putting a selection of articles online from the current issue. That would help bloggers like me highlight BC content when I read it, which is when it hits my mailbox. The July/August issue is full of excellent stuff. I will comment on two contributions: “Evolution vs. Naturalism” by Alvin Plantinga, and “The Great Debate,” by Douglas Groothuis Both of these guys are theists on testosterone. I don’t agree with either of them, but then, when all is said and done, I am a fideist, not a rationalist.

New to Books & Culture? It’s a fine periodical. For a nice introduction, there is this Peter Steinfels’ piece. David Brooks, who writes the best op-ed column to be found on the pages of the New York Times, seems to be a steady reader. He refers to it here.

A basic bibliography of authors cited in this post is provided at the end of this post.

Alvin Plantinga is John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame seems to have a fondness, she, for Calvinists. George Marsden, Mark Noll also come right to mind. I don’t blame her a bit.

Plantinga argues that naturalism and evolutionism are in conflict with one another. That’s because naturalism “leads to the conclusion that our cognitive and belief-producing faculties – memory, perception, logical insight, etc. – are unreliable and cannot be trusted to produce a preponderance of true beliefs over false” (p. 39). He quotes a letter of Darwin that shows that Mr. Evolution himself entertained precisely this doubt.

I don’t want to spoil the fun of reading Plantinga’s argument, which is careful and interesting as always. In essence, he concludes on first principles that “If evolutionary naturalism is true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is also very low” (p. 40). I think that’s true, but we – we being atheists and theists alike – will vouch for the fact that our faculties are more reliable than one might have guessed on first principles. Hence artifacts like science and technology – not to mention art, literature, and theology, but I digress. What I find fishy is that Plantinga leaps to the conclusion that “It is evolutionary naturalism, not Christian belief, that can’t rationally be accepted” (p. 40).

For a selection of Plantinga’s work, go here. For the extra long version of his argument that naturalism is a defeater of evolution, go here.

I concur that evolutionary naturalism does not have a satisfying explanation for the general reliability of our cognitive and belief-producing faculties (whatever “general” means, it’s just a placeholder for “more than we would expect on naturalistic assumptions). But you know, theism doesn’t have a satisfying explanation for some things either – I deduce that from the Bible. Take a look at the book of Job, and God’s answer to Job’s questions. Take a look at Qohelet. Think about Jesus’ question from the cross, “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?” To suggest that Scripture provides an answer to Job, Qohelet, and Jesus’ questions is absurd. It lets them stand. Which is precisely why I am a believer. Which is why I can’t stand atheists and theists alike who have all the answers. How dumb can you get? Come with me one day on my rounds as a pastor. If you know the answers to all the questions that arise therein, I will get down on my knees and worship you as if you were Zeus himself.

Douglas Groothuis, Professor of Philosophy at Denver Seminary, takes C. S. Lewis, G. K. Chesterton, and now Alister McGrath to task for locating the levers of faith in faith itself (I’m simplifying greatly, bear with me), rather than in rational argument. You have to admire his guts. He says: “If reason cannot decisively inform the debate between theism and atheism, then one wonders how a Christian can claim to have any  knowledge (justified true belief) about the object of supreme significance."

What, is true belief to be justified by reason of all things? Please. Read, Martin Luther’s Disputatio de Homine with Gerhard Ebeling’s commentary, and then get back to me. At most, one might want to claim that theism and atheism are both attractive and both problematic from the point of view of  reason, on different grounds.

For the rest, Groothuis does a very nice job of giving the lie to the wishful thinking of atheist apologists vis-à-vis the journey of Antony Flew. True, Varghese is an intellectual dwarf compared to Flew, but that doesn’t mean that Flew’s change of mind was not genuine. I’m reminded of Howard Mumma’s relationship with Albert Camus. It is completely within the bounds of possibility that Camus came to theism and even Christianity in his final years, as Mumma recounts. To anyone who has read Camus carefully, it all makes sense. But Mumma is a spiritual and intellectual dwarf compared to Camus – as Mumma himself would admit without difficulty. In the case of both Camus and Flew, we are struck by how little we know about the motivations behind their changes of mind. In my view, that is how it should be, even how it must be.

Groothuis also notes a number of strengths of Alister McGrath’s The Twilight of Atheism.

My case against rationalism is purely theological. If reason alone is able to bring someone to belief in God, then belief in God is something someone in their right mind must have. In that case, belief in God, what I consider to be the counterfactual act of trusting in God (if it wasn’t counterfactual, then eschatology is an unnecessary locus theologicus), would not be a choice, but a logical consequence. It would be a situation of force majeure.

I could not worship a God who compelled belief. Isn’t there something hideous about that thought? Anyone who thinks that reason necessarily leads to faith asks me to worship a hideous strength.

Bibliography

James Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated: Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Pierre Bühler, “La «Dispute au sujet de l’être humain» de Luther, hier et aujourd’hui,” ETR 69 (1994) 529-548; Gerhard Ebeling, Lutherstudien Bd. II. Disputatio de homine (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977-1989); Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London: Prometheus Press, 2005); idem with Roy Abraham Varghese, There is a God (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2007); Douglas Groothuis and James Sennett, In Defense of Natural Theology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005); Alister McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Howard Mumma, Albert Camus and the Minister (Brewster: Paraclete Press, 2000); Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Blackwell’s Great Debates in Philosophy; London: Blackwell, 2008)

Comments

[Adam Couturier]

John,

This paragraph is so well said, "My case against rationalism is purely theological. If reason alone is able to bring someone to belief in God, then belief in God is something someone in their right mind must have. In that case, belief in God, what I consider to be the counterfactual act of trusting in God (if it wasn’t counterfactual, then eschatology is an unnecessary locus theologicus), would not be a choice, but a logical consequence. It would be a situation of force majeure".

Great post!

[dave b]

John--thanks for alerting us to these pieces.

I find it difficult, though, to respond adaquately without being able to read the sources. A question though: is it the same thing to say that Christian belief can be rationally accepted AND that Christianity/theism has rational answers to all of life's mysteries. As you mention, Plantinga affirms the first but I would be surprised if he affirms the second. Are you perhaps being a little hard on Plantinga.

[JohnFH]

Hi Dave,

I just discovered that an extended form of Plantinga's B & C piece is available online, and more besides. I will revise and link appropriately.

No, Plantinga does not claim that Christianity/theism has rational answers to all of life's mysteries, but I have not been able to find occasions in which he highlights the fact that Scripture lets a range of questions stand, to be answered in another time and place.

As you may know, Plantinga regards belief in God as a properly basic belief, i.e., not dependent on other beliefs. Still, even a properly basic belief has to be compatible with, if not required by, the facts on the ground. The common assertion made by atheists that theism is not falsifiable and as such is not a properly formed hypothesis fails from more than one point of view (I've discussed this a bit already). On the other hand, Plantinga's own epistemology may be vulnerable here.

Plantinga is happy to point out instances in which naturalism is not only not required by the facts on the ground, but is not a good fit with them. My point is that there are facts on the ground that do not fit well with a Jewish or Christian world view either. In that case, the teams are tied from the point of view of reason alone.

Indeed, it is constitutive of biblical literature to face up to the counter-factuality of its hope, and not resolve attendant problems by means of rational argument. Perhaps I am exaggerating in turn, and minimize the role of rational argument in the teaching of Scripture, but I do so because, it seems to me, Plantinga over-reaches. By the way, I don't see this in Wolterstorff.

I would love to see the approaches of Wolterstorff and Plantinga compared.

[Justin Anthony Knapp]

John,

I very much appreciated your post and I'm interested in reading the source material.

As someone who was formerly convinced of the thoroughly rational nature of the universe and belief, I am becoming much more sympathetic to fideism. I am compelled more by the impossibility of what is morally necessary - e.g. love your neighbor as yourself - and the ineffability of God's essence personally, but your argument about God and coercive belief is worth considering once I've had sufficient rest.

It wouldn't be a comment from me if I didn't criticize something minute as well: it's "Antony" Flew, not "Anthony." As everyone well knows, there has never been a keen thinker by the name of Anthony.

-JAK

[JohnFH]

Thanks, Justin, for your encouragement and pointing out the spelling error, which I've corrected.