The Goal and Purpose of Genesis 1: John Walton Responds

John Walton has been kind enough to respond to my earlier post in which I challenged some of his conclusions on Genesis 1. Below the fold, he defends his conclusions with verve, and provides further supporting documentation. Enjoy!

The Goal and Purpose of Genesis 1: John Walton Responds

The reason that Genesis 1 has been understood as material for so long is because our world has been so entrenched in a material ontology that it cannot think that there is even another possibility.

On the meaning of ברא bara’, it is important to make the connection to the ontological argument. IF it is true (and I believe the evidence is substantial) that the ancient ontology is functional rather than material, then in their minds the line between existence and non-existence is a functional line rather than a material line. If existence is defined functionally, then to bring something into existence (=create) is a functional act. The ontology preceded the lexicography. In light of the ontology, the lexical data take on new significance as the objects of  בראbara’ are examined. My raw data chart for ברא bara’ may serve as a point of departure (go here). The chart will be explicated in my forthcoming Eisenbrauns monograph.

So, why can't Genesis 1 be both functional and material? Of course it CAN be both, but each one would have to be demonstrated, not assumed. Material cannot be the default simply because we have come to think in material terms most naturally. So consider the following:

1. I have given evidence that the initial verb is functional; several of the other verbs (separating, naming) are functional and integrally a part of the functional ontology of the ANE; the literary context is functional (1:2 does not begin with no material, but with no functions; 8:22 clearly restores functions in the aftermath of the flood that most all agree was undoing creation and presenting re-creation); the cultural context is functional, the textual assessment throughout the chapter is functional ("it was good"-- known to be functional when contrasted to what is not good in ch. 2); and the theology is functional (temple and rest in temple). It is difficult to detect any material interest at any level. With the pervasive functional perspective, the burden of proof lies on the person who wants to incorporate a material aspect.

Of course there IS a material phase (just as there was in "creating" a temple)--but the question has to be what part of the story is told in Genesis 1? One could say that a material phase preceded the creation of a temple, but the actual creation of the temple would have been in the seven day dedication, which is functional in orientation. It would be like the tension we feel between the descriptor "person" rather than the dehumanizing "carbon unit." Notice also the rhetoric connected with labeling in the discussions of abortion ("fetus" vs. "baby").

2. Of the seven days, three have no material suggestion at all (day 1 [light was not viewed as something material in the ancient world, and it is day and night that are being created since they are what is named]; day 3, day 7); Day 2 has a potentially material component, but nobody believes that a solid dome actually exists, so if that is material it makes for some problems (some say that the רקיע raqiʿa is not the dome but the space created by the dome, but then it is likewise not material). Two days have material components (4, celestial bodies, 6, people) but the text addresses them only in functional terms. This leaves only day 5. So how can we say that the orientation of the text is material? Why should we assume that it must, should or could be seen as a material account? We need to ask what makes US so interested in seeing it as material? Does it not take on the appearance of special pleading? Consequently, you can see that the semantics of ברא bara’ is only one small part of the argument.

My 2003 Lecture at Calvin College

People should not just work off my 2003 lecture online because my thinking has had a lot more development since then. At that point I was not yet analyzing in the context of ontology. The treatment in the chapter on Cosmology in Ancient Near Eastern Thought is a more helpful presentation the information.

Just a side note -- someone on the blog brought up my lecture at Calvin and suggested that I got taken to task. It must be understood, that I had a relatively small time slot and my main topic was the Chaoskampf motif. I took about ten minutes at the end of the lecture to present the Genesis 1 theory and apologetically presented it only as conclusions without the time to present the supporting evidence.  Of course people had questions and I fielded them to the best of my ability as time allowed. One of my respected colleagues there expressed doubts by asking what I would do with עשה ʿasah, since that seemed much more material. As you might imagine, the study of עשה ʿasah is far more complicated than ברא bara’, and all I could say was that having done the study, I did not find that it jeopardized the position. Full data to come in the Eisenbrauns monograph.

The Debate among Proponents of Young Earth, Old Earth, and Evolutionary Creationism

Contrary to the statement made by John in the original post, it is immaterial to me whether I "bypass the debate," for I have no vested interests in the debate. I am attempting to understand the text of Genesis as an ancient Near Eastern text--wherever that leads. If the conclusions reached in that attempt can be applied to the debate you mention with helpful results, that is fine, but I have no intentions in this respect.

Alan Lenzi’s Review of Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament

Alan Lenzi's review should be read more carefully. He took me to task, not on my data (though he disagreed with a few points as any competent reviewer should), but on his conclusion that I was still trying to use ANE comparative studies for apologetics. He acknowledged that I had stated that it was not my intention to do so ("Although apparently wanting to offer an alternative . . ."), but he concludes that I "explicitly return to this dichotomy throughout the remainder of the book." One of the main evidences he offers of this supposed methodological flaw is from a chart in the book (p.40), where I mentioned apologetic use, from which he concludes that was still pushing in that direction. Unfortunately, he misunderstood the chart. The chart was presenting how comparative studies HAVE BEEN USED, not how they SHOULD BE USED (noticing his misunderstanding, the chart will be more precisely titled in the next edition). It is equally unfortunate that he then decided that the book should not be used in universities because of its apologetics stance (a stance found primarily in his misreading of the chart). He seems confused that I would so contradict myself, when in reality, he has simply read the chart wrong.

Of course, I AM a confessional scholar, but the book was not an attempt to present or vindicate that approach but to move beyond it into common ground. I appreciate his review as I would any serious review, and I respect Prof. Lenzi's scholarship. But I was disappointed that he seemed to draw his conclusions based on something that I was not saying.

More Observations on the Meaning of ברא bara’

John in an earlier post cited BDB, but BDB is outdated both in information and in lexical semantic theory. It is characterized by a diachronic approach to lexical semantics that simply is unreliable. My conclusions were based on the data of the nature of the direct objects that the verb takes. If John or anyone else has a different read of the data, I would be happy to hear it. It is difficult to contest my conclusion that the objects are consistently functional.

John in the original post says that "For Walton’s redefinition to be plausible, he would have to show that all the ancient versions and the historical memory of the Hebrew language itself, which continues to use ברא Qal in reference to acts of creation, are fundamentally mistaken." That makes it sound that I am claiming that bara does not refer to an act of creation. That would be a misrepresentation. Of course bara is an act of creation--the only question is, what aspect of creation does it address. I would contend that functional creation was much more important in the ancient world, and is much more significant theologically. I tried to present the data that indicated that assigning functions is the ultimate act of creation. The fundamental mistake is that later interpreters and translators who cannot think beyond a material ontology have imposed their ontology on the text. You will recall that I likened Genesis 1 to a cosmic temple dedication account. What would the creation of a temple be? The material phase would only be staging. Even when the material phase was entirely complete, it would still not be a temple. The temple is created in the dedication ceremony when it is made functional.

John confidently asserts "bara in the Qal in ancient Hebrew probably has the specific concrete sense of ‘shape, form, fashion’ in Gen 1:27 and in Isa 43:1, 7; 54:16. A more generic “make’ is plausible in all other occurrences of ברא." What is this "probably?" Present the data across the spectrum of the 50 occurrences instead of making broad undefended statements. Why should anyone believe a "probably"?

I am surprised at John’s confidence when he says: "According to Walton, when Gen 1:21 says that ‘God created the great sea monsters,’ “the point need not necessarily be physical manufacturing as much as assigning roles (Genesis, p. 70). But this is strained." John has chosen ONE passage--I dealt with 50, and this passage fit the profile of the others (thanks to Rob for offering statements to that effect). You can't simply take one and deal with it independently. The fact is that Gen. 1:21 would be one of the occurrences that was ambiguous on its own.

If that were the only usage I had, it certainly would be strained. But I did not build my case on one passage. Only the other occurrences show clearly the inclination of the verb to refer to functions. John then follows with his statement, "Physical manufacture is the primary sense of ברא." What is the basis of this conclusion? John has not offered the evidence that should give him or his readers confidence in his opinion.

My Forthcoming Monograph

A full monograph entirely devoted to Genesis 1 with all of the ANE data and Hebrew lexical work has been on contract and in house at Eisenbrauns for two years. It was presented at a Midwest regional SBL meeting and I went right to book contract rather than start with articles. It is just caught in the logjam at the publisher and so has not yet appeared. Furthermore, a majority of the points that I make in presenting my position regarding functional creation are well-documented in the footnotes in Ancient Near Eastern Thought (though my conclusions on ברא bara’ were the result of my own study).

I hope this helps clarify some points.

Bibliography

John H. Walton, Genesis (NIV Application Commentary; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001); “Genesis and Cosmology” (lecture, 2003, go here); Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006)

The 2006 volume is reviewed by Alan Lenzi here.

Comments

[Ben]

If the ANE ontology was functional, where/when did we switch to a material ontology?

Do we have later interpretations of Genesis 1 with a functional ontology? Or did the switch to material ontology happen so early that we don't have any functional interpretations of the creation story?

[James]

For those of you wondering.

The manuscript is in-house here at Eisenbrauns. We are hoping for a Fall/Winter 2008 publication date. We do not currently have the item priced or available for pre-order. But, I assure you, it will be Eisenbrauns pricing, not Brill pricing : )

James

[Alan Lenzi]

I am very happy to hear about the monograph. As important as popularization is, it's still important to communicate with colleagues in established and scholarly forums! I look forward to reading all of the nitty-gritty details.

I will have some more to say later.

[Geoff]

I wonder when we talk of function, are we talking about purpose. They would be synonymous with one another, at least, in my understanding anyway.

When God creates he is giving purpose to what He creates. This agrees with the term "image" (tselem), with what is lost in the fall, and with the preacher in Ecclesiastes (all is vanity and chasing after the wind ... all is purposelessness)

[Mike]

Now I'm really curious about what you think of his argument now, John. I do hope you'll share some thoughts.

[Alan Lenzi]

For those unfamiliar with my review of Prof. Walton's book, it is not really pertinent to the issue of the meaning of ברא bara' highlighted in the original post here at John Hobbins’ blog. So what follows is a tangent, initiated by Prof. Walton, in the broader conversation.

Prof. Walton says that my main problem with his book is its apologetic purpose; he also says that in this I have misunderstood and therefore misinterpreted his book.

Let’s start with the first claim: He says, He [Lenzi] took me to task, not on my data (though he disagreed with a few points as any competent reviewer should), but on his conclusion that I was still trying to use ANE comparative studies for apologetics. That's true, I think Prof. Walton, despite his statements to the contrary, actually wrote an apologetic book. I should note, however, that this conclusion is not isolated from some of the disagreements in “data,” that is, some of the disagreements I have with Prof. Walton’s interpretations. To the contrary, some of these flagged Prof. Walton's apologetic intention. Here’s one of the details in data / interpretation that I found “problematic” or “unacceptable”: Prof. Walton says Mesopotamian ritual is based on “common sense and experimentation” (p. 136) while biblical ritual is based on revelation (“ritual procedures were not the result of revelation in anything like the sense that is found in the Pentateuch [instructions from Sinai], p. 137). He knows the texts well, and I think he would agree with me that the cuneiform scholarly texts and incantations frequently talk about the fact that they were revealed by the gods (šiptu ul yattun; ša Ea iqbû; pirišti / nişirti ilī). (If anyone needs more evidence, my recent monograph on secrecy shows how similar the Mesopotamian and Biblical mythologies of revelation actually are.) Why then does Prof. Walton make the generalization about Mesopotamian ritual when it is contradicted by the ancient texts themselves? I think the answer lies in Prof. Walton’s theological need to differentiate the Bible from its environment. In other words, there’s an apologetic agenda in this judgment about Mesopotamian ritual. So it’s true, I take Prof. Walton to task for his apologetic intent, but this judgment is rooted in particulars of the text, both explicit (as noted) and implicit (see my review where I discuss Prof. Walton’s telling use/lack of use of the term “myth” and his treatment of historiography.)

By the way, is there some rule that says a guy will get fired at Wheaton if he calls the Priestly account of creation a myth? Enuma elish is a myth. Why withhold the label from Genesis 1?

Before I sound like the evil agnostic who is trying to throw the believer out of the academy, my problem is not just with the book’s apologetic intent. Apologetic books are written all the time; and a person has every right to defend their faith. Rather, I have a problem with how Prof. Walton’s book clouds / hides the apologetic intent. Prof. Walton purports to be looking for common ground between confessional and critical scholarship. In other words, he wants to move beyond the impasse. So he presents himself as charting a middle course. Maybe that was his intention. I’m not calling him a liar. But I just don’t see evidence in his interpretations to back up the rhetoric. This really is a fundamental flaw in the book, in my opinion, because the text's agenda is submerged below the stated purpose; and this is something I think students will have a hard time discerning.

One can say I am reading against the author’s intention. But the text is what is central to this discussion. I didn’t have access to the author until today. And scholars don’t judge one another’s ideas based on intention; rather, on presentation. Texts are a matter of public record.

Prof. Walton, however, believes I have completely misunderstood him. He locates my problem, despite the evidence I mention in an earlier paragraph, specifically as follows: One of the main evidences he [Lenzi] offers of this supposed methodological flaw is from a chart in the book (p.40), where I mentioned apologetic use, from which he concludes that [I] was still pushing in that [apologetic] direction. Unfortunately, he misunderstood the chart.

See my review page four (bottom) for my initial take on the chart. The following assumes that discussion.

The chart on p. 40 is labeled figure 2, "Roles for Comparative Study." The text that points the reader to this chart is located on p. 38 just under the third major heading of the chapter, “Integrated Role” (of the Comparative Approach). The other two headings in the chapter are “Comparative Study and Critical Scholarship” and “Comparative Study and Confessional Scholarship.” I read this chapter then as Prof. Walton’s attempt to criticize both sides of the debate (critical vs. confessional) and find a middle course between them for the comparative method. This, I think, is outlined in the third section, “Integrated Role.” The chart on p. 40 is explicitly attached to this third section (p. 38) AND it is the very last thing in the whole chapter. It therefore has discursive prominence--- it looks like the capstone to the discussion. So one can understand why I have aligned the chart on p. 40 with the author’s attempt to find a middle course between the so-called extremes.

Prof. Walton says, The chart was presenting how comparative studies HAVE BEEN USED, not how they SHOULD BE USED (noticing his misunderstanding, the chart will be more precisely titled in the next edition). If this is really the case, then the chapter’s structure is very problematic. And the chart should be explicitly aligned with the confessional approach to comparative method. I would suggest a more thorough revision will be necessary to convey the author’s intention. But as it stands now, I don’t think I have misunderstood the text. The text may not represent the author’s conscious intention, but that’s not my fault.

As stated earlier, my main problem with the book is its hidden apologetic agenda. This judgment is not solely based on the chart on page 40 but several other interpretations and implicit judgments throughout the book, as noted above and in my review. There’s a lot one can learn from Prof. Walton’s book. My disagreement here and in the review, which could have used a little more tempering, does not diminish the respect that I have for his immense learning. I look forward to his forthcoming monograph.

[JohnFH]

Thanks, Alan, for clarifying your views, and for backstopping your earlier remarks in light of new evidence on the other thread.

I think it's only natural that a scholar approaches the data out of cultural loyalty of one or more kinds. It's wise, I think, to describe these loyalties to readers with care, and unapologetically. I tend to reconnoiter the cultural loyalties of a work I'm reading by looking at the footnotes. An intersecting set of loyalties is usually evident in a matter of minutes. I think it's important to learn how to read every work of scholarship, not only as an attempt to deal with the data responsibly, but as a confessional work of some kind, even if the confession is as limited as: "I'm a student of a student of W. F. Albright, and the leitmotifs of my research, its particular pietas, are largely explicable in that light."

So much of scholarship is about filial devotion of some kind. I'm not saying it's a bad thing.

[John H. Walton]

Thanks to Alan for clarifying his comments. There would still be a lot for us to discuss, but this is probably not the forum for it. Perhaps what can be said is that we appear to have different definitions of apologetics. There is a great difference between trying to "prove the Bible right" (a traditional approach to apologetics) and trying to understand and clarify real distinctions between the Bible and the ANE world, which all would admit exist. It was my intention to address the latter, and I would not consider that to be apologetics -- simply responsible scholarship that either confessional or critical scholars can engage in. That individuals might have differences of opinion about the nature of those differences would be no surprise.

As Alan already mentioned, none of this deals with my interpretation of Genesis 1, which was not a subject of his critique (though it would be presumptuous to infer his agreement on that basis).